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Executive Summary   
 
  In its waning days, the Clinton administration decided that it was appropriate to 
regulate mercury emissions from power plants. The incoming Bush administration had to 
decide how best to regulate these emissions. The Bush administration offered two 
approaches for regulating mercury emissions from power plants. The first was to 
establish uniform emission rates across utilities, as mandated by the 1990 Amendments. 
The second was to establish a cap on mercury emissions while allowing emissions 
trading in order to reduce the cost of achieving the goal. This paper presents the first cost-
benefit analysis of this issue that takes account of IQ benefits. We find that the benefits of 
the mercury regulation are likely to fall short of the cost. This assessment is based on a 
number of assumptions that are highly uncertain. The finding of negative net benefits is 
robust to many, though not all, reasonable variations in the model assumptions. We also 
find that the emissions trading proposal is roughly $15 billion less expensive than the 
command-and-control proposal. 1 
Designing Environmental Policy: Lessons from the  
Regulation of Mercury Emissions 
 




  In its waning days, the Clinton administration decided that it was appropriate to 
regulate mercury emissions from power plants. As part of a settlement agreement, it gave 
the incoming Bush administration the task of designing a regulation that would meet 
legal requirements. 
  The decision to regulate mercury emissions from power plants capped the end of 
a long process begun with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
1 which required that the 
EPA evaluate mercury and other toxic emissions to determine if they required more 
stringent regulation. After failing to meet this obligation, the Clinton administration faced 
law suits from environmental groups and ultimately agreed to make a determination on 
mercury regulation by December 15, 2000.
2
  This created a difficult challenge for the incoming Bush administration. While 
there were thought to be some identifiable economic benefits from regulating mercury 
emissions, such as an increase in IQ in children, it was not clear that the benefits of 
regulation justified the cost. Moreover, any decision to move away from regulating 
mercury would have to reverse the Clinton administration’s determination that such 
regulations were “appropriate and necessary.”
3
  The Bush administration offered two different approaches for regulating mercury 
emissions from power plants. The first was to establish uniform emission performance 
standards across utilities, as mandated by the 1990 Amendments. The second was to 
establish less restrictive emission standards, but to also establish a cap on mercury 
                                                 
1 Below, we also use the term “1990 Amendments.” 
2 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al. 
(1998). 
3 For a discussion of the need to reverse the “appropriate and necessary” designation, see the EPA’s 
proposed mercury rule, Fed. Reg. 69:20, pp. 4683-4688. 2 
emissions while allowing emissions trading in order to reduce the cost of achieving the 
goal.
4
  Reducing the risks posed by mercury exposure is a complex regulatory problem 
because mercury emissions affecting the U.S. come from a number of anthropogenic and 
natural sources, both inside and outside the U.S. While the U.S. regulatory proposals 
would address a portion of emissions coming from within the U.S. that are also deposited 
in the U.S., they would do nothing to address deposition coming from natural sources and 
from emissions coming from abroad. In fact, the sum of all domestic anthropogenic 
mercury emissions constitutes less than 3% of the global pool of emissions, and domestic 
utility sources account for less than 1%.
5  In assessing the benefits of regulating mercury 
emissions from U.S. utilities, we account for the global nature of the problem. 
  The basic science linking mercury emissions from power plants to impacts on 
humans is highly uncertain. Mercury is contained within coal and is emitted into the air 
when power plants burn the coal to generate electricity. The emitted mercury is then 
deposited on land and water. A reduction in deposition then leads to lower levels of 
methylmercury (an organic form) in fish.
6 Methylmercury exposure through fish 
consumption is the only established health pathway related to power plant mercury 
emissions. Furthermore, methylmercury is a known neurotoxin at high levels in humans. 
The theory is that low-dose exposure from fish consumption could also have damaging 
health effects, particularly for the developing fetus through maternal exposure. Thus, 
lower levels of mercury in fish, the dominant exposure pathway to humans, might 
provide health benefits for newborns. These benefits could include a reduction in 
neurological deficiencies in children that were exposed to it in the womb. The benefits 
could also include reduced risk of coronary heart disease in adults.
7
                                                 
4 This second approach finds legal justification under a different part of the 1990 Amendments than offered 
by the Clinton administration, so the Bush administration also proposed reversing the previous 
determination. 
5 See EPA (2004) and Pacyna, Pacyna, Steenhuisen, and Wilson (2003). 
 
6 See EPA (1997), Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2003), and Hrabik and Watras (2002). 
7 For a discussion of the possible health effects of mercury, see the EPA’s proposed mercury rule, Fed. 
Reg. 69:20, p. 4708. For a discussion of science linking mercury exposure to human health effects, see 
National Research Council (2000). 3 
  The relationship between low levels of methylmercury exposure through fish 
consumption and health effects in children and adults is uncertain. As we discuss later, 
many of the possible health effects are speculative. Even though the evidence is mixed, 
we focus on the impact of methylmercury on IQ scores of children. We do so because the 
key scientific studies have examined neurodevelopmental outcomes through the 
administration of tests of cognitive functioning.
8 In their final rule, the EPA also focused 
on IQ as the endpoint of interest.
9 Another recent study also incorporates the reduced risk 
of coronary heart disease in adults.
10 As we discuss later, we believe that this health end 
point is highly speculative and at this time does not warrant inclusion in the benefits 
estimate. 
  The economic costs of regulation are also highly uncertain, particularly for 
reaching stringent emission limits. Indeed, because the technology for meeting stringent 
emission limits is not readily available, the cost and effectiveness of meeting these limits 
is subject to debate. 
  This paper presents the first cost-benefit analysis of mercury regulation that takes 
account of IQ benefits. Previous analyses have not attempted to monetize benefits 
associated with mercury controls.
11 We consider the Bush administration’s two 
regulatory proposals. We find that neither of these proposals is likely to pass a benefit-
cost test; however, the proposal that allows for more flexibility in meeting the targets 
could save roughly $15 billion compared to the proposal that does not. 
  Section 2 provides an overview of the proposed rules for regulating mercury. 
Section 3 describes their likely impact on emissions and the costs of achieving the 
                                                 
8 According to the EPA “Participants [in EPA’s 2002 workshop] were also asked about endpoints to 
consider for monetization and they suggested looking at neurological tests that might lead to changes in IQ 
or other neurodevelopmental impacts. EPA determined that IQ decrements due to mercury exposure is one 
endpoint that EPA should focus on for a benefit analysis, because it can be monetized” EPA (2005), pp. 
180–1 81. 
9 EPA focuses on IQ changes, in part, because of “the availability of well-established methods and data for 
economic valuation of avoided IQ deficits, as applied in EPA’s previous benefits analyses for childhood 
lead exposure” (EPA, 2005, p. 9-1). 
10 See NESCAUM (2005). 
11 Schwartz (2004) estimates an upper bound on the improvement in average cognitive and neurological 
test scores of children who are above the EPA’s reference dose that results from a 70% reduction in 
mercury emissions. 
 4 
specified reductions. Section 4 provides an assessment of the benefits and net benefits of 
the proposals. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of Proposed Mercury Rules 
 
  On December 15, 2003, the EPA proposed two mutually exclusive options for 
regulating mercury emissions from electric utilities.
12 The first option proposed 
establishing uniform limitations on mercury emission rates across utilities, based on the 
type of coal the utilities use. The EPA determined these emission limitations for existing 
utilities based on the criteria established under section 112 of the 1990 Amendments.
13 
This standard is known as the “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT). This 
proposed rule would also set stricter emission limitations for new sources in each 
category.
14 While the language in the 1990 Amendments seems rather specific on how to 
set these standards for existing and new sources, there is some flexibility in the final 
determination.
15 The EPA expected that these emission rate limits would result in 
nationwide mercury emissions from power plants of 34 tons per year starting in 2008, 
which is a reduction from 48 tons estimated for 1999. 
  This regulatory proposal would require existing utilities to achieve the following 
mercury emission rate limits measured on an output basis: 21 ×10
-6 pounds per MWh for 
bituminous coal, 61 × 10
-6 pounds per MWh for sub-bituminous coal, and 98 × 10
-6 
                                                 
12 Regulated sources include any “fossil fuel-fired combustion units of more than 25 megawatts electric that 
serves a generator that produces electricity for sale. A unit that cogenerates steam and electricity and 
supplies more than one-third of its potential electric output capacity and more than 25 MWe output to any 
utility power distribution system for sale is also an electric utility steam generating unit” (Fed. Reg. 69:20, 
p. 4662). 
13 The 1990 Amendments state that emission standards for existing sources in each subcategory must not 
exceed “the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing 
sources... (1 12(d)(3)(A)).” 
14 The 1990 Amendments state that emission standards for new sources in each category must be set at “the 
emission control that is achieved in practice by the best controlled [existing] similar source” as prescribed 
by section 112 of the 1990 Amendments (112(d)(3)). 
15 For example, in computing the “best performing 12 percent” and the “best controlled. . . source,” the 
EPA allowed for potential variability in the emission data, which results in higher allowable emissions rates 
for both existing and new sources relative to using mean emissions. Consistent with the 1990 Amendments, 
the EPA’s proposal requires that these standards are met by early 2008. However, existing sources may 
seek a permit granting an additional one year to comply if such time is necessary for the installation of 
controls” (Fed. Reg. 69:20, p. 4682). 5 
pounds per MWh for lignite coal.
16 New sources would have to achieve much more 
restrictive mercury emission rate limits.
17 This command-and-control system does not 
allow utilities to trade emission reduction responsibility. Each individual unit must 
modify its plants to meet these emission rate limits or must shut down. 
  The second option proposed by EPA, which was adopted (in amended form) in 
the final rule, establishes emissions standards for new sources as defined under section 
111 of the 1990 Amendments. These performance standards are less restrictive than 
MACT, but this proposal also creates an additional cap-and-trade system for mercury 
emissions. The cap-and-trade system applies to both new and existing electric utility 
sources. A cap-and-trade program establishes the annual number of allowable emission 
permits (the “cap”), which is set below the existing emissions level.
18 Each regulated 
entity must submit one permit for every ounce of mercury emissions. The cost savings 
come from allowing power plants to trade permits, so that an operator that finds it costly 
to reduce its marginal unit of mercury can instead purchase a permit from another firm 
that can reduce an ounce of mercury for less cost.
19
  The proposed cap-and-trade system occurs in two phases. In the first phase, which 
starts in 2010, utility mercury emissions are capped at approximately 34 tons per year.
20 
The second phase of the mercury cap-and-trade program, effective starting 2018, caps 
utility mercury emissions at 15 tons per year. While we rely on model results based on 
                                                 
16 The statute also provides the following input standards: 2.0 pounds per trillion British thermal unit for 
bituminous coal, 5.8 pounds per trillion British thermal unit for sub-bituminous coal, and 9.2 pounds per 
trillion British thermal unit for lignite coal. 
 
17 The new source performance standards (measured on an output basis) are as follows: 6.0 × 10-6 pounds 
per MWh for bituminous coal, 20 × 10-6 pounds per MWh for sub-bituminous coal, and 62 × 10-6 pounds 
per MWh for lignite coal. 
18 The cap-and-trade rule has an additional complexity because of the 1990 Amendments. Rather than 
establish a national cap-and-trade market, the rule assigns an annual number of allowances to each state. 
The state has the choice of adopting the cap-and-trade rule, or achieving the required reduction through 
another EPA-approved state plan. Additionally, states could adopt the cap-and-trade rule and also set 
stricter standards on within-state utilities (see EPA, 2005, pp. 135–136). 
19 See, e.g., Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972). 
20 In the proposed rule, the exact level of this first-stage cap is to be determined based on the expected level 
of mercury emissions reductions achieved from reductions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides resulting 
from a separate rule. The EPA proposal suggested that a first phase cap of 34 tons (revised to 38 tons in the 
final rule) would be achievable from controls installed to meet limitations on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides imposed by a recent rule. Thus, they expect the need for additional mercury controls will not arise 
until the second phase cap in 2018. However, the model results we report suggest that some additional 
controls will be needed to meet the 34-ton first phase cap. 6 
the proposal, EPA’s final rule changed the first-phase cap to 38 tons. This may mean that 
our estimates slightly overstate the benefits as well as the costs of the final rule.
21
The EPA’s cap-and-trade system has some other features designed to reduce costs, but 
that also affect the distribution of mercury emission reductions over time. The cap-and-
trade system will allow utilities to bank any unused permits for later use. One would 
expect utilities to bank permits in the first phase of the program (resulting in fewer 
emissions in this phase than required by the overall cap) so that they can use the permits 
in the more-restrictive second phase of the program (resulting in more emissions in this 
phase than allowed by the overall cap). Thus, banking tends to smooth out the reductions 
required by the two-phase program. 
 
3. Emissions and Costs Under Two Proposals
 
  In this section we examine emissions and costs for the two proposals that were 
summarized in Sect. 2. Emission reductions will be critical because we will use this 
estimate to derive an estimate of the monetized benefits of the different proposals. These 
benefits will then be compared to the monetized costs.
22
  In estimating emissions reductions, a key issue is identifying incremental 
emission reductions. In what follows, our baseline scenario takes into account the rule 
promulgated by the Administration on March 10, 2005, known as the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule. This rule establishes cap-and-trade programs for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides 
emitted by electric utilities. It is important to consider this rule because the pollution 
control equipment that will be installed as a result of it will lead to significant reductions 






                                                 
21 Even though the final rule has a less restrictive first-phase cap, it also eliminated the “safety valve,” 
which would have enabled firms to borrow future permits at a pre-established price. Eliminating this 
feature in the final rule could increase slightly the restrictiveness of the rule relative to the proposed rule. 
For an early treatment of why a mixed permit-fee scheme (such as the safety valve) might dominate a 
permit approach, see Roberts and Spence (1976). 
22 Below, we also consider issues related to unquantified benefits and costs. 
23 The EPA also took the Clean Air Interstate Rule as their baseline scenario when it modeled the impact of 
the final mercury rule (see EPA, 2005, p. 76). 7 
3.1 Emission scenarios 
 
  We rely on two different models of the emission scenarios that will occur from 
the two mercury rules. Model 1 comes from analyses by the EPA and the Clean Air Task 
Force.
24 Model 2 comes from Charles River Associates.
25 Figures 1 and 2 show each 
model’s projected trends in national mercury emissions for the two mercury proposals.
26   
 





































Baseline MACT Cap and Trade
 
 
Notes: All Model 1 projections are estimated using the Integrated Planning Model and all scenarios assume 
the Clean Air Interstate Rule is in effect. For baseline and MACT projections, see Clean Air Task Force 
public comments submitted to the EPA (Docket OAR-2002-0056-4910).
 For Cap and Trade projections, 
see EPA (Docket OAR-2002-0056-0338). The Clean Air Task Force reported that the Integrated Planning 
Model projected mercury emissions to be 46 tons under the MACT in 2005. This does not make sense 
considering their estimate for mercury emissions under the Clean Air Interstate Rule alone was 46 tons. We 
revised down to 41 tons, which is the same as the projected mercury emissions for our baseline. EPA’s 
Clean Air Markets Division staff agreed this is a sensible revision. 
 
                                                 
24 We combine EPA and Clean Air Task Force model estimates because the former did not model mercury 
emissions given the MACT scenario and the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides rule. Both EPA and the 
Clean Air Task Force use the same Integrated Planning Model to derive their estimates. The Clean Air 
Task Force estimates are meant to use the same assumptions as the EPA estimates in order to make their 
numbers comparable. We obtained the Clean Air Task Force forecasts and cost analyses from their public 
comments submitted to EPA (Docket OAR-2002-0056-4910 and Docket OAR-2002-0056-0338). 
25 Charles River Associates uses the Electric Power Market Model to derive their estimates. We obtained 
Charles River Associates forecasts and cost analyses from the public comments submit¬ted to EPA 
(Docket OAR-2002-0056-2578) by the Electric Power Research Institute, which hired Charles River 
Associates. 
26 These emission scenarios in Model 1 allow for indefinite borrowing of future permits at the safety valve 
price, which is not allowed in the final rule. 8 





















































Baseline MACT Cap and Trade
 
 
Notes: Model 2 projections were estimated by Charles River Associates using the Electric Power Market 
Model.  We obtained Charles River Associates forecasts from the public comments submitted to EPA 
(Docket OAR-2002-0056-2578) by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), which hired CRA. All 
scenarios assume the Clean Air Interstate Rule is in effect.   
 
  Both models predict that the baseline scenario will reduce mercury emissions, 
which is expected because the control technologies stemming from the sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides rule are likely to yield reductions of mercury emissions. Model 1 predicts 
steady declines in mercury over time with the MACT standard, which is surprising since 
the MACT standard does not change over time. The model also predicts that cap-and-
trade will yield smaller reductions than MACT. The reason that it shows smaller emission 
reductions for cap-and-trade is likely because it assumed that firms could borrow future 
allowances indefinitely and never achieve the 15-ton goal. However, in the final rule 
EPA eliminated the borrowing option. While we use both models in our analysis of costs 
and benefits, we have greater confidence in the pattern of emissions that are projected 
under Model 2 because it is unaffected by the existence of the borrowing provision. 
  According to Model 2, the MACT will lead to a reduction of mercury to 34 tons 
(in 2008), and this level will hold relatively constant, declining to 31 tons by 2020. Model 
2 also predicts that the cap-and-trade scenario will lead to a reduction in mercury to 34 
tons in 2010, and that mercury will then steadily decline through the second phase of the 9 
cap-and-trade proposal, reaching the 15-ton cap in 2020, which is substantially below the 
MACT scenario. 
  In summary, both sets of emission projections forecast declines in emissions, but 
under Model 1, cap-and-trade appears to result in higher emissions over time as a result 
of the borrowing provision (which is not part of the final rule), whereas in Model 2, cap-
and-trade results in higher emissions in the short term, but lower emissions over the 
longer term. The timing of the reductions is important because the benefits of emission 
reductions are discounted over time. 
 
3.2 Estimated cost of the two mercury proposals 
 
  We rely on the same models as above for our estimates of the costs of the two 
mercury rules. These cost estimates are highly uncertain because they involve many 
assumptions based on limited data. For example, projected costs will depend on 
assumptions about future electricity demand, natural gas prices, coal production and 
usage, and the effectiveness of largely un-tested control technologies.
27
 
Table 1: Model 1 Incremental Cost Estimates for MACT and Cap and Trade 
(in billions of 1999 dollars) 
Year  MACT Costs  Cap and Trade Costs 
2005-2007 $0.0  $0.0 
2008-2012 $2.3  $0.2 
2013-2017 $2.0  $0.5 
2018-2020 $1.7  $0.1 
 
Notes: These costs derive from the Integrated Planning Model used by the EPA and others. The Integrated 
Planning Model reports total annual production costs for the electricity industry for three scenarios: MACT 
and the Clean Air Interstate rule are enacted, Cap and Trade and the Clean Air Interstate Rule are enacted, 
and only the Clean Air Interstate Rule is enacted. We compute incremental costs for both the MACT and 
Cap and Trade scenarios by subtracting the costs of the Clean Air Interstate Rule only scenario. These costs 
are understated because they do not include transaction costs, paperwork for the rule, and some small 
compliance costs like monitoring the mercury level at each plant.  The source for the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule only scenario and the Clean Air Interstate Rule plus MACT scenario is EPA (Docket OAR-2002-




                                                 
27 The most critical assumption in the cost models is the cost of the control technology (known as Activated 
Carbon Injection). Changes in the cost of this technology will have little impact in the early years of the 
cap-and-trade proposal, but by 2020, they could have significant impacts. Technology costs are more 
certain for the case in which all the MACT controls must be installed by 2008. 10 
Table 2: Model 2 Incremental Cost Estimates for MACT and Cap and Trade 
(billions of 1999 dollars) 
Year  MACT Costs  Cap and Trade Costs 
2004-2007 -$0.1  -$0.1 
2008-2009 $3.2  -$0.4 
2010-2011 $2.3  $0.4 
2012-2014 $1.8  $0.7 
2015-2017 $1.7  $0.7 
2018-2019 $0.8  $0.8 
2020 -$0.2  $1.1 
 
Notes: These costs derive from the Electric Power Market Model used by Charles River Associates.  It 
reports the incremental annual costs required to comply with the proposed rules.  Charles River Associates 
cost estimates are provided by the Electric Power Research Institute in their public comments to EPA 
(Docket OAR-2002-0056-2578). Cost figures represent incremental costs compared to a baseline scenario 
that assumes the Clean Air Interstate Rule is in effect. 
 
  Tables 1 and 2 show annual cost estimates for the MACT and cap-and-trade 
scenarios from both models. These estimates are the incremental costs relative to a 
baseline that includes the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides cap-and-trade rule. The 
highest costs for MACT occur in the early years of the rule (which starts in 2008), when 
firms retrofit their plants to meet the strict emission standards. The MACT rule does not 
provide flexibility in meeting the targets across time, so sources must meet the emissions 
rate limitation each year.
28
  Unlike the MACT proposal, the cap-and-trade proposal does allow flexibility 
across sources through trading and across time through banking. With the cap-and-trade 
proposal, Model 2 predicts relatively low costs in the early years, slightly increasing over 
time largely due to the need to install more experimental control technologies
29 in order 
to meet the stricter phase two standards. Model 1 predicts relatively constant incremental 
costs for cap-and-trade over time.
30 Since the cap-and-trade approach allows firms to 
gradually adopt the control technologies over time rather than the one-time massive 
                                                 
28 Both models suggest that the costs of MACT actually decline in later years. This is because the baseline 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides rule becomes more restrictive over time, thus increasing the amount of 
mercury reductions associated with the rule. 
29 Known as Activated Carbon Injection. 
30 Model 1 predicts constant costs because it assumes indefinite borrowing due to the safety valve. Thus, in 
this model, firms do not install control technology if the marginal cost of reducing emissions exceeds the 
safety valve price. This assumption is not valid for the final EPA rule that eliminated the safety valve. 
 11 
installation that must occur in order to meet the MACT requirements in 2008, the greater 
flexibility results in lower costs relative to the MACT proposal. 
  Table 3 contains the estimated present value costs of each proposal based on the 
two models.
31 The table presents three different discount rates —3%, 5%, and 7%.
32 In all 
cases, the table reveals that cap-and-trade is approximately 15 billion dollars less 
expensive than MACT for the period from 2005–2020. 
  
Table 3: Present Value Costs for 2005-2020 of MACT and Cap and Trade 
(billions of 2004 dollars) 
   Using Model 1 Estimates Using Model 2 Estimates
Discount Rate  MACT Costs  CAP and 
Trade Costs 
MACT Costs  Cap and 
Trade Costs 
3%  $23.2 $3.3 $20.7 $5.5 
5%  $19.5 $2.7 $17.8 $4.3 
7%  $16.5 $2.3 $15.4 $3.4 
 
Notes: These costs are computed by using the cost estimates from Charles River Associates, EPA, and the 
Clean Air Task Force listed in Table 1 and Table 2. Cost figures represent incremental costs compared to a 
baseline scenario that assumes the Clean Air Interstate Rule is in effect. We computed the present value of 
the sum of these annual costs, summing from 2005 to 2020, and we converted to 2004 dollars. 
 
  The cost estimates in Table 3 assume that any technological retrofits will be 
commercially available as demanded and that there will be no price increases due to an 
increase in demand, both of which are highly unlikely assumptions. In order to meet the 
regulatory standards, firms will need to increase their use of certain control technologies. 
For example, Table 4 shows a forecast of 64 gigawatts of Activated Carbon Injection 
retrofits (the technology for mercury reduction) by 2008 in order to meet the MACT 
regulation.
33 This technology is barely used today, so this large projected increase in its 
demand would likely raise its price. This suggests that the models underestimate the cost 
of meeting the regulations, perhaps by a substantial amount. This underestimation of 
                                                 
31 In order to compare the two models, and because Model 1 begins its estimates in 2005, we remove the 
cost estimates for 2004 (which were negligible) for Model 2 and assume that the costs of both proposals are 
zero in 2005. 
32 The Office of Management and Budget recommends to agencies that “For regulatory analysis, you 
should provide estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and 7 percent [discount rates]” OMB (2003). 
33 Sixty-four gigawatts constitutes approximately 20% of all coal plant capacity. 12 
costs is much more likely for the MACT scenario because it requires installation of a 
substantial amount of control technology over a very short timeframe.
34
  
Table 4: Model 2 Estimates of Retrofits (in Megawatts) 
 MACT  Cap  and  Trade 














2004  1,309 18,508  1,072  1,315 18,508  1,050 
2008 67,430  25,957  64,039  8,159  3,005  1 
2010 1,488  2,207  1,623  35,421  11,341  14,675 
2012 2,661  3,061  74  11,289  11,065  3,085 
2015  2,090 3,336 21  3,361 1,994 12,270 
2018  4,212 2,422 0  15,975  7,704 25,202 
2020  18,211 10,139 0  33,662 7,031  50,562 
Total  94,700 65,630 66,829  109,181  60,648 106,844 
 
Notes: This table combines Table VI-6 and VI-9 from Electric Power Research Institute public comments 
submitted to EPA (Docket OAR-2002-0056-2578). Scrubbers, also called flue gas desulphurization units, 
are primarily used to reduce sulfur-dioxide emissions. Selective Catalytic Reduction systems are primarily 
used to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions. Activated Carbon Injection systems require the installation of 
Fabric Filters, which together are called Compact Hybrid Particulate Collectors. This technology is 
relatively new and there is much uncertainty about both its cost and effectiveness. 
 
  The large $15 billion difference in costs between MACT and cap-and-trade is not 
too surprising. The MACT standard sets a rigid emissions rate limit on each unit. So no 
matter how much a unit operates, or how many total tons it emits, it still must achieve the 
assigned emissions rate through early capital investments. Thus, large plants that operate 
much of the time will emit much more than small plants that only run during peak periods 
because they must achieve the same emission rate. Under the cap-and-trade proposal, the 
larger plants will achieve much greater reductions than smaller peak-load plants, so there 
are much lower capital expenditures needed under the cap-and-trade proposal to achieve 
an identical emission level achieved by the MACT standard.
35
                                                 
34 While we contend that optimistic assessments of commercial availability of technological retro¬fits may 
lead to overestimates of MACT costs, it is important to note that some studies have found that EPA tends to 
overestimate the cost of regulations (see Harrington, Morgenstern, & Nelson, 2000). However, this same 
study finds evidence that benefits may also be overestimated. 
35 Even though MACT is much costlier than cap-and-trade, both Model 1 and Model 2 predict very few 
power plants exiting the market as a result of the MACT regulation. This is because the proposed MACT is 
technologically achievable with the current control technology. Few plants will exit rather than bearing the 
cost because existing coal plants are much less expensive to operate compared to existing gas plants. Thus, 
even marginal coal plants have large enough operating margins to be able to pay for the capital equipment 




  In this section, we derive estimates of benefits, taking careful account of the key 
steps in the pathway from emissions to human health impacts. 
 
4.1 Mercury emissions pathway: an overview 
 
  To evaluate the benefits of reducing mercury emissions from power plants, the 
relevant measure is the incremental benefit that accrues from a reduction in power plant 
mercury emissions. This estimate of the additional benefit of a reduction of mercury 
emissions from power plants is especially important because it accounts for the global 
nature of emissions and deposition. The EPA estimates that annual total global mercury 
emissions from all sources are about 5,000–5,500 tons per year.
36 Approximately 20% of 
these emissions are from natural sources, and approximately 40% are from re-cycling of 
mercury associated with past emissions. That leaves approximately 2,000 tons of mercury 
emissions per year attributable to current anthropogenic activities. As of 1999, mercury 
emissions from U.S. power plants accounted for only 48 tons per year (EPA, 1999).
37 
Thus, a regulation that would completely eliminate mercury emissions from U.S. power 
plants would reduce the global mercury pool by less than 1%. Completely eliminating all 
anthropogenic mercury emissions in the U.S. (approximately 115 tons per year) would 
lead to a reduction in the global mercury pool of less than 3%.
38
  In order to estimate the benefits of reducing U.S. power plant mercury emissions, 
we must consider each link in the pathway from emissions to health outcome, which is 
shown in Fig. 3. Since this is a U.S. regulation, our concern is with methylmercury 
exposure for U.S. citizens. A reduction of U.S. power plant mercury emissions leads to 
an associated reduction in mercury deposition in the U.S. This reduction in U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
36 See EPA (2004). 
37 U.S. total annual anthropogenic mercury emissions have declined significantly over the past 15 years due 
to regulations of mercury use in goods, regulations on incineration of mercury-containing wastes, and 
mercury reductions from power plants stemming from regulations on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. 
38 See EPA (2004) and Pacyna et al. (2003). This highlights one of the main difficulties with the regulatory 
approach to mercury reductions. Part of the mercury emissions from electric utilities deposit locally, but a 
larger part enters the pool of emissions that deposit globally. Thus, elimination of mercury emissions is 
both a local and global public good, and any domestic regulation will incur costs without addressing the 
mercury transported from abroad. 14 
deposition leads to an associated reduction in methylmercury levels in U.S. freshwater 
and marine fish. This reduction in methylmercury levels in U.S. fish is then weighted by 
the proportion of domestic fish consumption that is caught domestically. We use 
estimates of the mean level of methylmercury for each fish type consumed by U.S. 
residents, so by assuming that blood mercury levels are determined strictly from fish 
consumption, we can compute the change in methylmercury blood levels given the 
change in methylmercury consumption from domestic fish. We then combine this 
measure of exposure with toxicological evidence of the effect on health outcomes. For 
this study, we focus on changes in IQ scores in children as the primary health outcome of 
mercury exposure.
39 The final step of the benefits assessment is to monetize the 
improvement in children’s IQ scores stemming from the reduction in power plant 
mercury emissions.
40
  For our analysis, we assume that methylmercury levels in farm-raised U.S. fish 
are not affected by any changes in power plant mercury emissions because these are not 
predatory fish that gain nourishment from the top of the food chain, a condition for 
methylmercury accumulation. For the analysis we present below, we also assume that 
mercury levels of U.S. residents stemming from fish caught in non-U.S. waters will be 
negligibly affected by reductions in U.S. mercury emissions. The reason is that we 
include all marine fish caught in U.S. waters in our analysis. This leaves approximately 
50% of fish consumption by U.S. citizens stemming from fish caught overseas. While our 
analysis may not include some fish caught overseas and eaten domestically, it also treats 
some U.S.-caught fish from the Pacific Ocean as domestic fish, even though they would 
be unaffected by a regulation of domestic power plant mercury emissions. More 
importantly, given that U.S. power plant emissions make up less than 1% of global 
emissions, the impact of the regulation will have a minimal impact on methylmercury 
levels on overseas fish. While we do not present them in our tables, our estimates suggest 
                                                 
39 As we mentioned before and throughout, we agree with EPA that IQ changes represent the clearest 
measure of the neurological outcomes examined in studies using tests of cognitive function¬ing. As we will 
discuss later, we believe the impacts on coronary heart disease are highly speculative and do not warrant 
monetization within the analysis. 
 
40 We rely on point estimates of the relationship between blood mercury levels and IQ scores even though 
most analyses find that the relationship is not statistically different from zero. 15 
that including the effect of the regulation on domestically consumed international fish 
leads to only a $2–$5 million increase in benefits. 
 
4.2 Mercury emissions pathway: emissions to deposition 
 
  An annual reduction in U.S. mercury emissions leads to a less than proportionate 
reduction of mercury deposited in the U.S. The reduction is not one-to-one because most 
U.S. mercury emissions are not deposited within the U.S., and U.S. deposition also stems 
from other sources.
41 Figure 4 shows estimates of existing U.S. mercury deposition.
42 For 
most of the country, over 60% of the deposition comes from other countries, showing that 
a significant amount of mercury is transported across national boundaries. 
  While there is a limited understanding of the transport of both types of mercury, 
the EPA’s Mercury Report to Congress
43 on the mercury emissions from all domestic 
sources estimates that approximately 34% of domestic mercury emissions are deposited 
locally.
44 The other 66% contributes to the global pool of (elemental) mercury. In the 
same report, the EPA estimates that approximately 80 tons of mercury are deposited 
annually within the U.S. Thus, reducing all 48 tons of mercury emissions from U.S. 
power plants will result in a reduction of 16 tons of mercury emissions, which is a 20% 
reduction in U.S. annual deposition.
45
 
4.3 Mercury emissions pathway: deposition to methylmercury in U.S. fish 
 
  Mercury deposition is converted by bacteria into methylmercury, which is 
believed to be toxic to humans because it is relatively easily absorbed into the blood 
through fish consumption (EPA, 2004). Methylmercury exposure through fish 
                                                 
41 Power plants emit only inorganic forms of mercury, both in a soluble divalent (ionic) form and in an 
insoluble elemental form. The elemental form, because it is insoluble, tends not to be deposited locally. 
42 Source: Vijayaraghavan et al. (2004). 
43 See EPA (1997). 
44 This means the mercury deposits somewhere in the continental United States, including parts of the 
ocean near the coastline and parts of the Gulf of Mexico. See EPA (1997), Fig. 3-3, for a depiction of the 
area covered. 
45 This 20% is computed as the total reduction in U.S. emissions (48 tons) multiplied by the percent of 
emissions deposited locally (34%), divided by the total U.S. deposition (80 tons). The 20% estimate is 
likely a high-end estimate. A recent study by Seigneur, Vijayaraghavan, Lohman, Karamchandani, and 
Scott (2004) suggests that reducing all 48 tons of mercury emissions from U.S. power plants will result in 
an 8.6% reduction in U.S. annual depositions (see Schwartz, 2004). 16 
consumption is the main route of exposure.
46 Methylation occurs through biological 
processes and the methylmercury then can accumulate in fish tissue. Fish at the top of the 
food chain, such as bass and swordfish, therefore tend to have higher methylmercury 
concentrations in their tissues. However, the methylation process depends on many 
factors, including water chemistry, oxygen conditions, acidity, and water circulation. 
Deposition directly to a water body or into a watershed is only one component of 
mercury addition, further modified by methylation of the oxidized component of that 
deposition. This explains why there is no clear scientific evidence of a correlation 
between mercury deposition in a given location and resulting methylmercury in fish 
tissues within the corresponding watershed(s), with some studies finding no correlation, 
some finding a positive correlation, and one even finding a negative correlation.
47
  The EPA’s Mercury Study Report to Congress
48 stated, “Because of the current 
scientific understanding of the environmental fate and transport of [mercury], it is not 
possible to quantify the contribution of U.S. anthropogenic emissions relative to other 
sources of mercury. . .on methylmercury levels in seafood consumed by the U.S. 
population.” There is, thus, great uncertainty about the relationship between mercury 
deposition and the level of methylmercury in fish. 
  For our assessment, we assume a proportionate change in methylmercury in fish 
resulting from the change in mercury deposition.
49 That is, given that we assume that 
eliminating mercury emissions of U.S. power plants will reduce total deposition in the 
U.S. by 20%, we likewise assume that this will reduce methylmercury in U.S. fish by 




                                                 
46 See Mahaffey, Clickner, and Bodurow (2004). 
47 See Miller et al. (1972), Carrington, Cramer, and Bolger (1997), Lutter (2000), Hrabik and Watras 
(2002). 
48 See EPA (1997). 
49 Hrabik and Watras (2002) found that a 10% reduction in annual mercury deposition led to a 5% 
reduction in fish mercury. The authors note that “they know of no other ecosystem where such a rapid 
response has been observed, with the possible exception of some highly contaminated sites following 
remediation.” 
50 We also assume that the change in deposition leads to an immediate change in methylmercury in fish 
tissue. This is a very conservative assumption, because according to EPA, “the lag period changes in fish 
tissue (and hence changes in IQ) can range from less than 5 years to more than 50 years, with an average 
time span of one to three decades” (EPA 2005, p.184). 17 
4.4 Mercury emissions pathway: methylmercury in U.S. fish to methylmercury in                                    
U.S. women of child-bearing age 
 
  In order to estimate the effect of methylmercury levels in fish on blood mercury 
levels, we assume that blood mercury levels in women of child-bearing age are entirely a 
function of fish consumption. Using 1999–2001 data on the amount of fish caught in the 
U.S., imported into the U.S., and exported out of the U.S., we compute the average 
annual proportion of fish (by tons of each fish commodity) consumed in the U.S. that was 
caught in U.S. waters.
51 This includes freshwater fish and marine fish, both commercially 
and recreationally caught. That is, for each type of fish eaten within the U.S., we estimate 
the average annual proportion that was caught within U.S. waters and would thus be 
affected by the proposed regulation. We link these data with FDA estimates of the mean 
concentration of mercury in each type of fish.
52 We then compute the amount of mercury 
people in the U.S. consume from U.S.-caught fish as a proportion of the amount of 
mercury people in the U.S. consume from all fish. We aggregate across all fish 
commodities and find that 46% of U.S. mercury ingestion comes from fish caught within 
U.S. waters. We further assume that this estimate for the U.S. population holds for 
women of child-bearing age.
53 Thus, a reduction in methylmercury in U.S. fish leads to 
an associated 46% reduction of methylmercury blood levels in U.S. women of child-
bearing age. 
 
4.5 Mercury emissions pathway: from methylmercury in U.S. women of child-
bearing age to toxicity 
 
  Perhaps the most difficult assessment is to estimate the dose–response 
relationship between mercury exposure and children’s cognitive skills. The three main 
epidemiological studies on this relationship examine populations in the Republic of the 
Seychelles,
54 the Faroe Islands in the North Sea,
55 and New Zealand.
56 These populations 
                                                 
51 Our definition of fish caught in U.S. waters includes all U.S.-landed fish. This includes freshwa¬ter fish, 
recreational fish, and marine fish in U.S. waters. The data are from the National Marine Fisheries (see 
http://www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/trade/). 
52 The FDA data are available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~frf/sea-mehg.html 
53 This might be a conservative assumption, because Oken et al. (2003) found evidence that pregnant 
women reduced their consumption of fish as a response to the EPA’s fish advisory. 
54 See Myers et al. (2003). 18 
all have diets that rely heavily on fish consumption, and thus have much higher mercury 
exposure than in the U.S. Because we are interested in measuring the impact of mercury 
exposure on children’s IQ, we focus on the endpoint of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children full-scale IQ.
57 Both the Seychelles and New Zealand studies used this 
measure as an endpoint; however, the Faroe Islands relied on three sub-tests of the 
Wechsler scale, which allows one to infer the full-scale IQ effects.
58
  Table 5 shows the linear coefficient estimates (of the relationship between 
mercury in either maternal hair or cord blood and various scores) for the three studies. 
The Seychelles study finds that a unit (1 ppm) increase in maternal hair mercury levels is 
associated with a 0.13 point decline in the Wechsler score. This relationship is not 
statistically different from zero. The New Zealand study (after dropping the one child 
with high mercury levels but test scores within the normal range and after controlling for 
education and age of the child) finds that a unit increase in maternal hair mercury levels 
is associated with a 0.42 point decline in the Wechsler score. This relationship is also not 
statistically different from zero. Finally, for the three Wechsler scale outcome variables 
used in the Faroe Islands study—Digit Spans, Similarities, and Block Designs—the 
authors find that a unit increase in cord blood mercury levels is associated with a 0.0025, 
0.0039, and 0.0175 decline in the three test scores, respectively. Of these three coefficient 
estimates, none are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, yet the Block 
Designs coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. While most of the 
estimated coefficients in Table 5 are not statistically significant, they all have the 
expected sign. We adopt the approach implicit in NRC (2000) of relying on point 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 See Grandjean et al. (1997) and Budtz-Jorgensen, Debes, Weihe, and Grandjean (2004). One potential 
concern with the Faroe Islands study is that this population was exposed to high levels of polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) via pilot whale meat. The study could not completely control for PCB exposure because 
only half of the newborns were tested for PCBs, and cord-tissue PCB concentrations are not known to be 
reliable indicators of PCB blood levels. 
56 See Kjellstrom et al. (1989) and Crump, Kjellstrom, Shipp, Silvers, and Stewart (1998). 
57 Below, we refer to this IQ measure as the Wechsler score. 
58 Also, while the Faroe Islands study uses cord-blood mercury levels as their primary exposure measure, 
the Seychelles and New Zealand studies use maternal hair mercury measures. According to Grandjean et al. 
(1997), 1 ppm of mercury in maternal hair is roughly equal to 5 ppb of mercury in cord blood. For our 
benefit estimates, we adjust the coefficient estimates accordingly. We also present standardized coefficient 
estimates, which are unaffected by the conversion between the maternal hair and cord blood measures. 
Finally, because we assume a linear relationship between methylmercury exposure and IQ scores in order 
to compute the IQ effects, we rely on the linear estimates of the Faroe Island study computed in Budtz-
Jorgensen et al. (2004). 19 
estimates with large standard errors, even though they are not within conventional ranges 
of statistical significance. 
 
Table 6: Present Value of Net Benefits Using Model 2 (Billions of 2004 dollars) 
 MACT  Cap  and  Trade 
Discount 
Rate 
Benefits Cost  Net  Benefits  Benefits Cost  Net  Benefits 
3%  $0.08-$0.14  $20.7  ($20.62) – ($20.56)  $0.09-$0.15  $5.5  ($5.41) – ($5.35) 
5%  $0.07-$0.12  $17.8  ($17.73) – ($17.68)  $0.07-$0.12  $4.3  ($4.23) – ($4.18) 
7%  $0.06-$0.11  $15.4  ($15.34) – ($15.29)  $0.06-$0.10  $3.4  ($3.34) – ($3.3) 
 
Notes: Computed from Charles River Associates estimates of costs and emissions. Parentheses indicate 
negative values. Net benefits equal benefits minus costs. 
 
4.6 Monetizing benefits 
 
  As discussed earlier, the latest Center for Disease Control study on mercury found 
that the geometric mean of blood mercury levels for 2001–2002 was 0.83 ppb (95% 
confidence interval = 0.73–0.93). Using the data from 1999 to 2002 of pregnant women, 
we fit a log normal curve through the percentile distribution in order to estimate an 
arithmetic mean of blood mercury concentrations. We find that the mean blood mercury 
concentration for pregnant women is approximately 1.4 ppb (with a standard deviation of 
approximately 2.4). Using this estimate, and given the assumptions on exposure, we 
estimate that a complete elimination of U.S. power plant emissions (48 tons) would result 
in a decrease in mean maternal blood mercury levels of 0.13 ppb.
59
  Our focus, nonetheless, is on estimating the change in methylmercury levels for 
developing fetuses. There is some evidence that the ratio of methylmercury levels in fetal 
cord blood to methylmercury levels in maternal blood is greater than one. The NRC 
report concludes that the central tendency for this ratio is 1.2–1.3.
60 The EPA
61 estimated 
a ratio of 1.7. A recent study by Stern and Smith (2003) also recommends an estimate of 
1.7. Using the 1.7 estimate, we therefore estimate that eliminating U.S. power plant 
mercury emissions would result in a decrease in mean fetal cord blood mercury levels of 
0.22 ppb (0.13 × 1.7). By linking this with the estimates in Table 5 (and by assuming a 
                                                 
59 This estimate derives from the product of each parameter estimate in the benefit pathway; i.e., 0.13 = 
0.20 × 0.46 × 1.4. 
60 See NRC (2000). 
61 See EPA (2001, 2003). 20 
conversion factor of 5 ppb of cord blood per 1 ppm of hair
62), we find that the reduction 
of 0.22 ppb in fetal cord blood mercury levels leads to an increase in Wechsler scores of 
0.00572 for the Seychelles study and an increase in Wechsler scores of 0.01848 for the 
New Zealand study. For the Faroe Islands study, we convert the increases in each of the 
listed sub-tests into an increase in Wechsler scores.
63 We find a Wechsler score increase 
of 0.01156. Averaging the three expected score increases yields an expected increase of 
0.012 points given a complete elimination of mercury emissions from U.S. power plants. 
  In order to monetize the benefits of this increase in IQ stemming from the 
mercury reduction, we rely on estimates by Agee and Crocker (1996), in which they 
examine parental decisions in purchasing chelation therapy for their children. Chelation 
therapy reduces the lead in children’s bodies. Lutter (2000) then links this estimate of the 
willingness to pay for lead reduction in children to an estimate of the relationship 
between lead and IQ scores. He finds that parental choices on chelation therapy suggest a 
willingness to pay between $1,295 and $2,236 per IQ point for their children (updated to 
2004 dollars). 
  Above we estimated that there is a 0.012 point expected increase in the Wechsler 
score given the complete elimination of the 48 tons of annual mercury emissions from 
U.S. utilities. In order to monetize the benefits of the proposed regulations, we multiply 
this estimate by the proportional decrease in annual emissions. We then multiply by the 
expected number of newborns each year in the U.S. to get the annual increase in IQ 
points from the proposed regulations from 2005 through 2020.
64 Using the low-end 
estimate of $1,295 per IQ point, we find the estimated total benefits of the MACT 
proposal is $82 million using a 3% discount rate, $70 million using a 5% discount rate, 
and $63 million using a 7% discount rate. For the cap-and-trade rule, the estimated total 
benefits are $86 million, $68 million, and $58 million using a 3%, 5%, and 7% discount 
rate, respectively. Using the high-end estimate of $2,236 per IQ point, we find the 
estimated total benefits of the MACT proposal is $142 million using a 3% discount rate, 
$120 million using a 5% discount rate, and $109 million using a 7% discount rate. For the 
                                                 
62 See Grandjean et al. (1997). 
63 See Sattler (1988) and Tellegen and Briggs (1967). 
64 Estimates of future births come from U.S. Census, National Population Projections: Summary Files, 
“Components of Change for the Total Resident Population: Middle Series, 1999 to 2100 (NP-T6-A).” 21 
cap-and-trade rule, the estimated total benefits are $149 million, $118 million, and $100 
million using a 3%, 5%, and 7% discount rate, respectively.
65
  Our estimates can be subjected to a sensitivity analysis. As mentioned previously, 
if we consider the reduction in U.S. mercury consumption stemming from the reduced 
contribution of U.S. emissions to global deposition, then the regulation will include an 
additional $2–$5 million in benefits. If we estimate benefits using the 95th upper 
confidence interval of the toxicity point estimates, the benefits increase by a factor of 2.5. 
  Perhaps the one assumption that we should be most cautious about is our estimate 
of the value of an IQ point. We rely on Lutter (2000) and Agee and Crocker (1996) 
because they derive the only willingness-to-pay estimate, which is an appropriate 
measure to use for estimating benefits. However, there are some potential problems with 
using chelation therapy in order to infer the value of an IQ point. First, chelation therapy 
is inconvenient and by some accounts painful, which would lead to an underestimate of 
willingness to pay for IQ increases. Second, the magnitude of the long-term effect of 
chelation therapy on IQ is unclear. What matters for the willingness-to-pay measure is 
parental perceptions of this effect. This last point is essential, as there is mixed evidence 
of the effectiveness of chelation therapy. Presumably, parents must believe it has at least 
limited effectiveness, or else the implied willingness-to-pay estimate would be zero. If 
parents think it is more effective than it really is, then the implied willingness-to-pay 
would be an underestimate. If they think it is less effective than it really is, then the 
implied willingness-to-pay would be an overestimate. 
                                                 
65 These benefits are derived using Model 2. Although not reported in the tables, we also computed the total 
discounted benefits for both rules using Model 1’s forecasts of emissions. We find virtually identical results 
for the MACT scenario, but due to the binding safety valve assumed in Model 1 (which no longer applies), 
this model estimates lower benefits from the cap-and-trade rule. EPA presents benefits for the cap-and-
trade rule that are about one order of magnitude smaller than those presented here even though EPA uses a 
value for IQ points that is more than four times higher than the value we use. Accounting for part of this 
difference is the slope of our linear IQ dose–response curve, which is more than double EPA’s slope in 
absolute value. Additionally, EPA assumes that benefits will not occur until 5–50 years in the future. If we 
were to assume a time lag of 25 years and EPA’s assumptions regarding the IQ dose–response curve and 
the value of an IQ point, our benefits would decrease by about half. The remaining discrepancy between 
EPA’s benefits and our benefits is primarily the result of our conservative assumption that all fish from 
boats coming to U.S. ports, including freshwater and marine fish, are affected the same by reductions in 
mercury emissions from U.S. coal-fired power plants. EPA assumes that only freshwater, recreational fish 
are significantly affected by the cap-and-trade rule because the relationship between mercury deposition in 
oceans and methylmercury concentrations in marine fish is uncertain and U.S. coal-fired power plants 
account for a lower percentage of mercury deposition in the ocean. 
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  Our assumption for the values of an IQ point of $1,295 to $2,236 does, however, 
seem consistent with the estimates in the literature of the effect of IQ on earnings.
66 
Admittedly, there is no clear consensus on the impact of IQ on earnings. Some studies 
(such as Bound, Griliches, & Hall, 1986) claim that there is no significant impact of IQ 
on earnings. Others, such as Zax and Rees (2002) estimate that a one standard deviation 
increase in IQ score leads to a 5.85% increase in earnings. Given the estimates of lifetime 
earnings used by Trasande, Landrigan, and Schechter (2005), this would mean an 
increase of approximately $3,300 for girls and $4,400 for boys per IQ point. Cameron 
and Heckman (1993) estimate that a standard deviation increase in IQ score leads to a 
7%–10% increase in earnings. This translates into a gain of approximately $5,300 to 
$7,500 for boys and a gain of approximately $3,900 to $5,600 for girls. On the high end, 
a study by Neal and Johnson (1996) finds a 17% increase given a standard deviation 
increase in IQ. This translates into a gain of approximately $13,700 for boys and $9,500 
for girls. Thus, the estimates of lost earnings due to an IQ decrement range from 0 to 
$13,700 for boys and from 0 to $9,500 for girls. Using the high-end value of an IQ point 
from Neal and Johnson (1996) increases our benefit estimates by a factor of 
approximately 5.2, which is not enough for the benefits of either regulation to outweigh 
the estimated costs. 
  We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties in our estimates of costs and 
benefits. We should note that EPA’s benefit estimate of the cap-and-trade rule is about 
one order of magnitude smaller than our estimate. The only way we think our conclusions 
would change dramatically would be if there were substantial benefits that could result 
from reducing mercury that we have not quantified. 
  One such potential benefit is the reduced risk of cardiovascular health in adults 
due to a reduction in mercury exposure. We believe that the link between methylmercury 
and cardiovascular health is not strong enough to warrant inclusion in the benefits 
analysis, especially given two recent studies that find no association between mercury 
exposure and coronary heart disease.
67 In their proposed rule, the EPA agreed with this 
assessment, stating that “it has been hypothesized that there is an association between 
                                                 
66 All estimates of the value of an IQ point are presented in 2004 dollars. 
  
67 See Hallgren, Hallmans, and Jansson (2001) and Yoshizawa, Rimm, and Morris (2002). 23 
methylmercury exposure and an increased risk of coronary disease in adults; however, 
this hypothesis warrants further study as the few studies currently available present 
conflicting results.”
68 In EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis of the final rule, they 
conclude that “[s]tudies investigating the relationship between methylmercury and 
cardiovascular impacts have reached different conclusions. The findings to date and the 
plausible biological mechanisms warrant additional research in this arena.”
69
  NESCAUM (2005), however, does estimate the benefits from reduced myocardial 
infarctions.
70 However, they base this health effect on only one study (Salonen et al., 
1995) and acknowledge that “the epidemiologic studies showing an association between 
methylmercury exposures and cardiovascular effects are comprised of a relatively small 
number of subjects. . .” (p. 47) and that “the predicted myocardial risks ... should be 
interpreted with caution. Most of the evidence of such risks is based on observations from 
a single cohort. Additionally, a great deal of evidence indicates that fish consumption in 
general protects individuals from incurring adverse cardiac events” (p. 69).
71
  Some critics of the administration’s mercury proposals argue for reducing annual 
power plant emissions to 5 tons.
72 We did not examine this proposal because there is no 
reliable modeling information on its costs. However, given that it is likely that the costs 
of removing mercury increase more than proportionately for greater reductions, while the 
                                                 
68 See Fed. Reg. 69:20, p.4658. 
69 See EPA (2005). 
70 Even if we include the NESCAUM (2005) estimated benefits of reduced myocardial infarctions for 
males, the net benefits of the mercury MACT regulation are still negative. NESCAUM (2005) finds that net 
benefits are positive when including these benefits, but this is because they assume a baseline scenario in 
which there was no new rule for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Given that this rule is already in place 
and will lead to reductions in mercury emissions, an assessment of the mercury rule should account for 
these reductions in the baseline. If we accept all of NESCAUM’s (2005) bounding assumptions and include 
their estimated benefits of reduced myocardial infarctions for males and females, then the net benefits of 
the cap-and-trade regulation do indeed become positive. However, NESCAUM (2005) conducts a separate 
analysis assuming only cardiovascular benefits to males, since “only one study evaluated cardiovascular 
disease and mercury exposure in women (Ahlqwist, Bengtsson, Lapidus, Bergdahl, & Shutz, 1999) and this 
study did not report a statistically significant association” (p. 47). Using only the estimated cardiovascular 
benefits to males, the MACT and the cap-and-trade regulation both have negative net benefits in our model. 
71 NESCAUM (2005) acknowledges that their estimated benefits of reduced myocardial infarc¬tions are 
based on the assumption that the Salonen et al. (1995) sample of Finnish men “can be externally 
generalized to the U.S. population despite differences between these populations and the types of fish 
consumed” (p. 92). In their computation of lost life years, NESCAUM (2005) also assumes that the age of 
death coincides with the average age of the first myocardial infarct, which they acknowledge is “extremely 
uncertain and conducted as a bounding exercise” (p. 95). See Stern and Smith (2003) and Lutter and Irwin 
(2002) for critiques of the Salonen et al. (1995) study. 
72 See Clean Power Act S.150 (2005). 24 
benefits increase roughly proportionately, any alternative plan to further reduce mercury 
would likely impose greater net costs than the ones already proposed. 
  One issue that some proponents of regulation have raised is that mercury 
regulation could also result in benefits from reductions in particulate matter. While some 
of the technologies used to reduce mercury could also reduce particulate matter, this is 
not likely to have an impact on the overall level of particulate matter.
73 The reason is that 
current regulations already impose caps on sulfur dioxides and nitrogen oxides, which are 
the primary pollutants that affect the level of particulate matter. Thus, mercury regulation 
is not likely to have any significant independent impact on the overall level of particulate 
matter, and is an expensive way to achieve them. 
  This step-by-step analysis of the benefits of mercury reduction demonstrates that 
there are likely to be relatively small health improvements stemming from reductions of 
mercury emissions from domestic utilities. This is because the path linking domestic 





  We can combine the previous analysis of costs and benefits to obtain a measure of 
net benefits. Table 6 summarizes the information on benefits and costs, and shows the net 
benefits of the two different policy options using different discount rates. No matter 
which of the three discount rates is used, the net benefits of both proposed regulations are 
far below zero. Indeed, costs are larger than benefits by well over two orders of 
magnitude for the MACT proposal and well over one order of magnitude for the cap and 
trade proposal. Net present value costs of the cap-and-trade proposal are around $3–$5 
billion dollars. The net present value costs of the MACT proposal are about $15–$21 
billion dollars. 
  Although neither proposal yields positive net benefits, the gap between costs and 
benefits is lower for the cap-and-trade proposal. One concern about the cap-and-trade 
approach is that it will result in hot spots, which are localized concentrations of emissions 
                                                 
73 The analysis used to justify the EPA’s proposal discusses particulate matter benefits. See Schwartz 
(2004) for a discussion of the relationship between particulate matter reduction and the mercury rule. 25 
stemming from plants in a small area garnering a substantial number of permits to 
pollute. With respect to the mercury risk pathway, a hot spot would be an identifiable 
peak in mercury deposition into a water body that has consumable fish. This is not likely 
to be a concern with the mercury cap-and-trade approach for three reasons. First, as 
previously discussed, most mercury emissions are not deposited locally, so a local spike 
in emissions may not result in a localized hot spot. Second, even if emissions did not 
disperse, hot spots would only present a health risk if the deposition affected a local stock 
of fish that are caught and consumed. Third, model estimates by the Electric Power 
Research Institute indicate that neither the cap-and-trade approach nor the MACT 
approach will lead to hot spots. They also find that the cap-and-trade approach is less 
likely to lead to hot spots than the MACT proposal because the former requires larger 
cuts in emissions.
74 Finally, given the minimal benefits of mercury reduction, it is highly 
unlikely that the issue of hot spots would warrant taking on the greater costs of the 
MACT proposal. 
  The bottom line is that the regulation of utility emissions does not appear to be 
worth the costs. Given the uncertain nature of many of the assumptions that go into the 
cost-benefit analysis, there is room to debate this conclusion. As more evidence is 
brought forth on the exposure and toxicity of mercury stemming from power plants, the 
assessment of benefits and costs can change. But given the current state of understanding, 
our findings suggest that the cost of regulating power plant emissions of mercury is not 














                                                 
74 See EPRI (2004, 2005). 26 
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